Low Birth Rate
Overview
Low birth rate (저출산) refers to a phenomenon in which a society's total fertility rate remains persistently and substantially below the replacement fertility rate (approximately 2.1 children) needed to maintain its population size. It is not merely a matter of individual choice to have fewer children, but a structural outcome produced by the interlocking systems of marriage, employment, housing, education, and care—making it a topic at the intersection of demography, economics, and social policy. In South Korea, the total fertility rate fell below 2.1 in 1983 and continued to decline, recording 0.72 in 2023 and 0.75 in 2024—a level overwhelmingly lower than that of any other OECD member country.
Key Details
Definition and Measurement Indicators
- Total Fertility Rate (TFR): The average number of children a woman is expected to bear during her reproductive years (ages 15–49). It is calculated by summing age-specific fertility rates for a given period, with 2.1 considered the replacement fertility rate.
- Crude Birth Rate (CBR): The number of live births per 1,000 people per year. It is heavily influenced by population structure.
- Number of Births: In South Korea, births fell from about 438,000 in 2015 to 230,000 in 2023, before rebounding to 238,000 in 2024—the first increase in nine years.
- Dead Cross: The phenomenon in which the number of deaths exceeds the number of births. It first occurred in South Korea in 2020 and has continued every year since.
Causes
The causes of low birth rate can be broadly divided into demographic and socioeconomic factors. First, "demographic momentum" is at work, as the population of women of childbearing age itself shrinks. Second, the number of marriages has plunged and the age at first marriage has risen, shortening the period during which childbirth is possible. Third, employment insecurity among young adults, high housing costs, and the burden of child-rearing expenses, including private education costs, discourage decisions to marry and have children. Fourth, a labor market structure that makes work–family balance difficult, career interruption, and the unequal sharing of housework and caregiving disproportionately raise the opportunity cost of childbirth for women in particular. Fifth, a competition-driven educational environment and long working hours are also cited as major factors.
Socioeconomic Impact
A decline in births leads directly to a shrinking working-age population, which in turn translates into lower growth rates, deterioration of social insurance finances such as the National Pension and National Health Insurance, a reduction in conscription resources, school consolidations driven by a declining school-age population, and a deepening risk of extinction for small provincial cities. At the same time, as aging proceeds in parallel, the burden of the dependency ratio grows, giving rise to the "population cliff" problem.
Policy Responses
In 2005, South Korea enacted the Framework Act on Low Birth Rate in an Aging Society and has established basic plans on a five-year cycle. Representative policies include parental benefits and child allowances, the First Meeting Voucher, expanded parental leave and spouse's childbirth leave, special housing supply for newlyweds and families with multiple children, and expanded childcare support. In June 2024, the government declared the low birth rate a "national emergency" and launched a government-wide response system, and in October 2025 the Ministry of Population Strategy Planning, which oversees population policy, was launched. Abroad, cases often cited include France's family allowances and childcare infrastructure, Sweden's flexible parental leave and public childcare, and Hungary's housing- and loan-linked support.
Latest Trends
In 2024–2025, South Korea's number of births shifted to an upward trend. The total fertility rate of 0.75 in 2024 marked the first rebound in nine years, and in 2025 the quarterly number of births continued to rise compared with the previous year. Factors cited as background include the recovery of marriages that had been delayed by COVID-19, a temporary increase in the population of women born in the early 1990s, expanded housing and child-rearing support, and unusually generous childbirth incentives offered by some local governments. However, experts also offer a cautious view, arguing that it is difficult to regard this as a "structural rebound." They note that the size of the rebound is largely attributable to base effects and temporary factors, and that the trend could reverse downward again unless the marriage rate and employment conditions for young people improve fundamentally. The center of policy gravity is also shifting from simple childbirth incentives to expanding care infrastructure, housing stability, work–family balance, and support for settling in local regions. Internationally as well, East Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan, and China are commonly experiencing ultra-low fertility, and are reviewing the socialization of care alongside immigration policies.
Related Topics
- [[Aging]]
- [[Population Decline]]
- [[Total Fertility Rate]]
- [[Ministry of Population Strategy Planning]]
- [[Parental Leave]]
- [[Local Extinction]]
- [[National Pension]]