May Become a Trigger Condition for the Nuclear Weapons Law

A document summarizing discussions on the conditions for nuclear use and their interpretation under North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Policy Act.

May Become a Trigger Condition for the Nuclear Weapons Law

Overview

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Policy Act (핵무력정책법), adopted at the Supreme People’s Assembly in September 2022, legislated the conditions and procedures for the use of nuclear weapons. Unlike previous political declarations, it codified the requirements for nuclear use in statutory form, drawing attention from the international community. While defining nuclear forces as a “last resort,” the law also contains provisions allowing preemptive use if threats to the leadership or national strategic assets are detected, sparking debate that certain situations could become “trigger conditions.” This document covers the law’s main provisions, their interpretation, and the implications for the security environment on the Korean Peninsula.

Main Content

Background of Enactment

In 2013, North Korea adopted the “line of simultaneously building nuclear forces and the economy,” officially declaring its nuclear possession domestically and internationally. It subsequently advanced its nuclear capabilities through intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests and its sixth nuclear test in 2017. After U.S.–North Korea negotiations reached a stalemate after 2018, North Korea sought to legally fix the status of its nuclear forces, and the result was the Nuclear Weapons Policy Act adopted on September 8, 2022.

Conditions for Nuclear Use (Trigger Conditions)

Representative conditions specified in the law are as follows.

When an attack on the national leadership and the nuclear command and control system is imminent or has been carried out
When a large-scale attack on important national strategic targets is attempted
When an attack using nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is carried out or imminent
When an emergency arises that threatens the existence of the state and the survival of the people

Particularly noteworthy is the provision specifying “automatic and immediate nuclear strikes as soon as the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons are created,” interpreted as a “dead hand”–style clause under which nuclear forces may be launched according to pre-delegated authority when the command leadership is struck and the normal command system cannot operate.

Preemptive Use Provision and Interpretive Controversy

While the law defines the purpose of nuclear use as “deterring aggression,” it also provides an exception allowing preemptive use if the opponent is judged to be attempting a nuclear or WMD attack. This gave rise to controversy over whether it effectively permits “preemptive nuclear use.” South Korea and the United States assessed this provision as the language of an offensive threat rather than deterrence, whereas some researchers view the statutory provision as closer to a political message for maintaining deterrence.

Situations That Could Become Trigger Conditions

Scenarios that could actually be interpreted as trigger conditions include: ① precision strikes that could be perceived as decapitation operations against the leadership, ② cases in which large-scale South Korea–U.S. joint military exercises are judged to be preparations for invasion, ③ preemptive strikes on nuclear and missile facilities, and ④ signs of rapid internal collapse of the regime. However, the North Korean authorities monopolize the criteria for judging which situations constitute an “imminent threat,” so whether the conditions are triggered in practice depends on political judgment.

International Legal and Practical Issues

UN Security Council resolutions prohibit North Korea’s nuclear development, and the Nuclear Weapons Policy Act directly conflicts with such international norms. In addition, the “automatic launch” provision specified in the law raises concerns that it increases the risk of misjudgment by heightening the possibility of command-and-control failure.

Recent Trends

In 2024–2025, North Korea has repeatedly sent external messages based on the Nuclear Weapons Policy Act and continues a discourse that appears to define strengthened South Korea–U.S.–Japan security cooperation as a “situation meeting the conditions for nuclear use.” In particular, analysis is raised that expanding military cooperation with Russia could shake the structure of international pressure on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. South Korea and the United States are solidifying their response posture through strengthened extended deterrence (nuclear umbrella) and operation of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), and assessments are spreading that the ambiguity of the conditions itself affects both deterrence and crisis stability. Meanwhile, a view coexists that emphasizes the provisions’ character as a negotiating card rather than their actual likelihood of being invoked.